Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts.
分析不完全合同如何引导有效投资。外生转换成本下固定价格合同有效，产生价格刚性并间歇性小幅重谈；双向特定投资需充分的价格指数条款；单向特定投资则产生“照付不议”合同。
The authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment. With exogenous switching costs, fixed-price contracts are efficient, generate some rigidity in prices, are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts, and when inflation is positive, generate asymmetric responses to shocks, all consistent with evidence on prices and wages. With two-sided specific investments, efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation, as observed in many long-term contracts. A third case, with one-sided specific investments, can generate 'take or pay' contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly.