When Is Social Responsibility Socially Desirable?
研究了企业社会责任如何因应低效规制而产生，企业可能游说低效规则并鼓励社会责任行为，这既可能增加也可能减少社会福利，取决于政治俘获成本。
We study a model in which corporate social responsibility arises in response to inefficient regulation. In our model, firms, governments, and workers interact. Firms create negative spillovers that can be attenuated through government regulation, which is set endogenously and may not be socially optimal. Companies can hire socially responsible employees who enjoy correcting spillovers. Because firms can capture rents created by allowing this, they sometimes find it optimal to lobby for inefficient rules and then encourage socially responsible behavior in their midst. Thus, social responsibility can either increase or decrease social welfare, depending on the costs of political capture.