Authority and Incentives in Organizations
研究一家由所有者、经理和两个部门组成的公司，分析部门间外部性如何影响最优的权威分配和货币激励设计，发现当合作重要且激励困难时，将两个部门的权威集中委托给一个部门负责人是最优的。
Abstract I consider a corporation that consists of an owner, a manager, and two divisions. There exist externalities between the divisions: if a division behaves cooperatively, its success will increase the performance of the other division. The owner creates monetary effort incentives and allocates decision authority over the divisions. I characterize how externalities and benefits of control determine the corporation's optimal organization. The introduction of endogenous incentives changes the major findings of the existing literature, because then concentrated delegation of authority over both divisions to one of the division heads will be optimal if cooperation is important and divisions are difficult to incentivize.