Is Transparency To No Avail?*
研究了委员会决策中公众对透明度的需求与成员对透明度的厌恶，发现透明度压力会导致私下预会议，虽不改善问责但可能提升决策质量。
Abstract Transparent decision‐making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens might suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else would there be the secrecy? We provide a model of committee decision‐making that explains the public's demand for transparency, and committee members' aversion to it. In line with case study evidence, we show how pressures to become transparent induce committee members to organize pre‐meetings away from the public eye. Transparency does not improve accountability, but it might improve the decision.