PEER TRANSPARENCY IN TEAMS: DOES IT HELP OR HINDER INCENTIVES?*
研究了两轮努力投资博弈中，透明度（允许观察对方努力）对集体和个人努力的影响，发现透明度能消除劣等均衡，有时还能促进合作，但若努力可替代则无影响。
In a joint project involving two players of a two‐round effort investment game with complementary efforts, transparency, by allowing players to observe each other’s efforts, achieves at least as much, and sometimes more, collective and individual efforts relative to a nontransparent environment. Without transparency multiple equilibria can arise, and transparency eliminates the inferior equilibria. When full cooperation arises only under transparency, it occurs gradually : No worker sinks in the maximum amount of effort in the first round, preferring instead to smooth out contributions over time. If the players’ efforts are substitutes, transparency makes no difference to equilibrium efforts.