On Oligopolistic Markets for Nonrenewable Natural Resources
在完全信息静态条件下分析不可再生资源市场的非合作寡头行为，证明了产出路径的Cournot-Nash均衡存在性，并得出比较动态结果：若供应商成本相同，增加供应商数量或均等化储量会加速资源开采；若成本不同，均衡会导致低效生产，高成本储量可能先于低成本储量耗尽。
Noncooperative oligopoly behavior in nonrenewable resource markets is analyzed under stationary conditions assuming perfect information. The existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in output paths is established under standard cost and demand assumptions, and a number of comparative dynamic results are obtained. If all suppliers have the same costs, for instance, and total reserves are fixed, either increasing the number of suppliers or equalizing their reserve holdings causes more rapid resource use. If suppliers' costs differ, it is shown that equilibrium involves inefficient production; high-cost reserves may even be exhausted before low-cost reserves.