Short-Run Politicians and Long-Run Tax Revenue: An Empirical Assessment
利用美国经济生命周期增长模型，计算了最大化稳态税收收入的税率，并与短期政治家为最大化当期收入而设定的税率进行比较，发现短期政治家并不一定会将税率设定在稳态最大化水平之上。
A life-cycle growth model fit to the U.S. economy is used to calculate the tax rate that would maximize steady-state tax revenue. The rate that would be set by a interested in maximizing current-period receipts is also calculated. In the current period, the capital stock is fixed but labor is a variable factor. Following the intuition of Buchanan and Lee (1982), it might be suspected that this fixity of capital would lead the short-run politician to set taxes above the steady-state revenue-maximizing level. However, such a conclusion does not hold for the cases considered in this study.