The aggregate impacts of tournament incentives in experimental asset markets
研究锦标赛激励中的奖励和惩罚如何影响实验资产市场的价格行为，发现调整合约后交易减少但泡沫更大更持久，且这些效应随交易者经验消失。
Abstract We examine how rewards and penalties under tournament incentives impact price behaviour in experimental asset markets. Adding a penalty to a reward-only contract, or a reward to a penalty-only contract, changes the traders’ behaviour. The experimental markets with adjusted contracts experience less trading, but longer-lived and larger bubbles. This observed effect of penalties is consistent with herd-driven behaviour under relative performance evaluation, while the effect of rewards reflects the influence of the convexity of bonuses. However, these effects dissipate with trader experience. Our findings contribute to the debate attributing market instability to incentive structures in the finance industry.