A Dynamic Model of Auctions with Buy‐It‐Now: Theory and Evidence
研究了雅虎式“立即购买”拍卖中买卖双方的风险规避行为，推导出最优出价策略和定价，发现卖家总是受益，买家仅在高估值时受益，且最优BIN价格会提高预期成交价，数据验证了该结论。
In the ascending‐price auctions with Y ahoo!‐type buy‐it‐now ( BIN ), we characterize and derive the closed‐form solution for the optimal bidding strategy of the bidders and the optimal BIN price of the seller when they are both risk‐averse. The seller is shown to be strictly better off with the BIN option, while the bidders are better off only when their valuation is high enough. The theory also implies that the expected transaction price is higher in an auction with an optimal BIN price than one without a BIN option. This prediction is confirmed by our data collected from T aiwan's Y ahoo! auctions.