Using Revenue Sharing to Implement Flexible Prices: Evidence from Movie Exhibition Contracts
研究了电影放映合同中收入分成比例随上映时间递减的现象，通过模型和西班牙影院合同数据证明这是发行商实现灵活定价的手段，并区分于风险分担和道德风险解释。
Movie exhibition contracts entail revenue‐sharing terms that go down with weeks since release. We develop a simple model to show how the form of these contracts can be explained by the distributors’ desire to set flexible prices. We then use detailed data on theater‐movie contracts in Spain, where we exploit the information available at the time of contracting for movies previously released in the U . S ., and other movie and theater characteristics, to show how the implications of our flexible pricing argument are supported in the data, and differentiate our explanation from prior, more standard risk‐sharing and moral‐hazard explanations.