No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax
通过智利40多万家企业的两个随机实验，研究第三方信息（纸质记录）对增值税执法的威慑效应，发现纸质记录能预防逃税并产生向上游的执法溢出，证实考虑逃税后不同税种存在显著差异。
Claims that the VAT facilitates tax enforcement by generating paper trails on transactions between firms contributed to widespread VAT adoption worldwide, but there is surprisingly little evidence. This paper analyzes the role of third-party information for VAT enforcement through two randomized experiments among over 400,000 Chilean firms. Announcing additional monitoring has less impact on transactions that are subject to a paper trail, indicating the paper trail's preventive deterrence effect. This leads to strong enforcement spillovers up the VAT chain. These findings confirm that when taking evasion into account, significant differences emerge between otherwise equivalent forms of taxation.