Assessing the Performance of Conservation Auctions: An Experimental Study
通过实验室实验比较了竞争性招标与固定价格计划在分配保护合同中的表现，发现拍卖仅在一次性设定中优于固定价格，重复后优势消失，预算约束拍卖对重复更稳健。
<i>This work uses controlled laboratory experiments to investigate the budgetary and the economic performance of competitive tenders for allocating conservation contracts to landholders. Experiments have been replicated in two different countries to check for robustness of results. We find that auctions outperform the more traditional fixed-price programs only in the one-shot setting. With repetition, the auctions quickly lose their edge. The budget-constrained auction performs similarly to the target-constrained in the one-shot setting but appears more robust to repetition. Our results suggest that previous estimates of conservation auction performance are too optimistic, and we propose a method for improving such estimates.</i>