Entrepreneurship, Financiership, and Selection*
构建了一个创业融资市场的均衡模型，发现经济层面的财富约束会导致有利选择，即高生产率者成为创业者、低生产率者成为融资者；融资越容易，低生产率者也会被吸引创业。
Abstract We develop an equilibrium model of the market for entrepreneurial finance, in which all agents have some personal wealth and a project whose quality is their private information. All agents choose whether to invest either as entrepreneurs or financiers, or to invest in storage technology. We find that a binding economy‐level wealth constraint, which renders credit scarce, can create advantageous selection, where productive agents become entrepreneurs and unproductive agents become their financiers. If funding is easier to obtain, entrepreneurship also attracts unproductive agents. In our model, individual wealth and entrepreneurship are positively (negatively) correlated if financial market participation is complete (incomplete).