COLLUSIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES WITH UNKNOWN COSTS*
研究了无限重复古诺寡头垄断中成本未知时的合谋均衡，比较了混合完美贝叶斯均衡和分离均衡（含信号传递或沟通），发现含沟通的最优分离均衡能带来最高的期望折现联合利润。
The article studies collusive equilibria in an infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs. I look at collusive pooled Perfect Bayesian equilibria and separating equilibria either with signaling or with communication. In the separating equilibria with signaling the firms play the strictly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium in period 1 and produce the optimal incentive compatible collusive quantity vector from period 2 onwards. In the separating equilibrium with communication the optimal incentive compatible quantity vector is produced from period 1 onwards. Among these, the optimal separating equilibrium with communication gives the highest expected discounted joint profits.