Governance and Politics: Regulating Independence and Diversity in the Board Room
分析了董事会监管的经济逻辑，发现无员工董事、董事兼任多职、性别多样性低时企业价值更高，而董事会独立性与绩效无关，这与流行观点和现行治理政策相悖。
Abstract: This paper analyzes the economic rationale for board regulation in place and for introducing new regulation in the future. We relate the value of the firm to the use of employee directors, board independence, directors with multiple seats, and to gender diversity. Our evidence shows that the firm creates more value for its owners when the board has no employee directors, when its directors have strong links to other boards, and when gender diversity is low. We find no relationship between firm performance and board independence. These characteristics of value‐creating boards support neither popular opinion nor the current politics of corporate governance.