Interfirm Bundling and Vertical Product Differentiation
研究了独立企业成对提供捆绑折扣的竞争效应，发现均衡中同质企业均提供捆绑折扣，导致标价上升、折扣后捆绑价下降，仅高质量卖家获利增加，且损害消费者和社会福利。
Abstract In this paper, we study the competitive effects of bundled discounts offered by pairs of independent firms. In a setting with vertically differentiated goods, where firms decide whether to participate in a discounting scheme before prices are set, it is shown that, in equilibrium, all pairs of firms producing goods of the same quality level offer bundled discounts. Relative to the no‐bundling benchmark, we find that (i) all headline prices rise, (ii) all bundle prices, net of the respective discount, decrease, and (iii) only high‐quality sellers will obtain higher profits. Furthermore, this equilibrium corresponds to the worst scenario in terms of consumer welfare, and it and decreases social welfare.