THE EFFECT OF AUCTION FORMAT ON EFFICIENCY AND REVENUE IN DIVISIBLE GOODS AUCTIONS: A TEST USING KOREAN TREASURY AUCTIONS*
比较统一价格拍卖与歧视性拍卖在韩国国债拍卖中的表现，发现歧视性拍卖带来更高收入和更优的国债分配效率，但差异因竞争激烈而不大。
This paper measures the efficiency and revenue properties of the two most popular formats for divisible goods auctions: the uniform‐price and discriminatory auction. We analyze bids into the Korean Treasury auctions which have used both formats. We find that the discriminatory auction yields statistically higher revenue. Unlike previous work that uses data from only one format, we are able to compare the efficiency properties of the two formats. We find that the discriminatory auction better allocates treasury bills to the highest value financial institutions. However, the differences in revenue and efficiency are not large because the auctions are very competitive.