Can Management Turnover Restore the Financial Statement Credibility of Restating Firms? Further Evidence
研究发现财务重述后更换管理层（CEO和/或CFO）的公司更可能再次重述，且后续重述主要归因于新管理层，表明管理层更替并非有效的补救机制，反而可能降低盈余质量。
Abstract This paper investigates the association between management turnover following financial restatements and the probability of subsequent restatements. We find that restating firms that replace management (CEO and/or CFO) are more likely to restate their financial statements again. We also find that subsequent restatements are mainly attributable to the new management. Overall, our results suggest that management turnover following restatements may not be an effective mechanism to remediate financial restatements, but the change to a new management results in a greater possibility of lower earnings quality (i.e., higher probability of subsequent financial restatements and accruals‐based earnings management). Our study supports prior literature's findings that the change in the top management leads to organizational instability and higher accounting information risk. Our findings have implications for internal decisionmaking with regard to top executive replacement.