Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets
通过分析联合国官员在曼哈顿的停车行为，研究发现来自高腐败国家的外交官累积更多未付罚单，而2002年执法部门获得没收外交牌照权力后，违规大幅减少，说明文化规范和法律执行都影响腐败。
We study cultural norms and legal enforcement in controlling corruption by analyzing the parking behavior of United Nations officials in Manhattan. Until 2002, diplomatic immunity protected UN diplomats from parking enforcement actions, so diplomats' actions were constrained by cultural norms alone. We find a strong effect of corruption norms: diplomats from high-corruption countries (on the basis of existing survey-based indices) accumulated significantly more unpaid parking violations. In 2002, enforcement authorities acquired the right to confiscate diplomatic license plates of violators. Unpaid violations dropped sharply in response. Cultural norms and (particularly in this context) legal enforcement are both important determinants of corruption. (c) 2007 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.