Large-scale privatization in transition economies
构建了一个模型，解释东欧大规模私有化进展缓慢的原因，认为私有化存在正溢出效应，可能导致零私有化陷阱或完全私有化均衡，并分析了补贴和最低收入保障的作用。
To explain the slow progress of mass privatization programs in Eastern Europe, the authors present a model based on a positive spillover between aggregate privatization and the individual expected return to privatization, derived from a potential populist backlash if costly reforms do not bring forth sufficient aggregate privatization. The model allows for the simultaneous existence of a pessimistic zero-privatization trap and an optimistic full-privatization equilibrium defined by a critical mass of expected privatization. While both privatization subsidies and minimum-income guarantees can by themselves secure coordination on the optimistic equilibrium, the financing constraint may offset the direct effect. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.