A Model of Equity Based Compensation with Tax
构建了一个两阶段连续时间模型，研究不同税收制度下员工股票期权的估值，发现税收规则显著影响行权行为，并比较了英美两国最优薪酬形式。
Abstract In this paper, we develop a two‐stage continuous time model of employee stock option (ESO) valuation under different tax regimes. We show that tax rules can have significant effects on ESO exercise behavior. In addition, we find that incentive stock options (ISO) are the optimal form of compensation for all levels of employees in the UK. In the US, restricted stock plans are preferred, and tax breaks offered by incentive schemes are only beneficial to employees with high liquid wealth (or small option holdings relative to wealth) or low risk aversion. We also analyze 83b elections for restricted stock plans in the US and find that making an election is a sub‐optimal decision for both the employee and the firm.