CEO Risk‐taking Incentives and Bank Loan Syndicate Structure
研究了借款公司CEO的风险承担激励如何影响辛迪加贷款的结构，发现激励越高时，辛迪加更集中、主牵头行保留更多份额，且这一效应受主牵头行声誉、借贷关系及公司信息透明度等因素调节。
Abstract This paper investigates the effects of a borrowing firm's CEO risk‐taking incentives on the structure of the firm's syndicated loans. When CEO risk‐taking incentives are high, syndicates are structured to facilitate better due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates have a smaller number of total lenders and are more concentrated, and lead arrangers will retain a greater portion of the loan. Moreover, CEO risk‐taking incentives have a lesser effect on the syndicate structure when lead arrangers have a good reputation and a prior lending relationship with a borrowing firm, while they have a greater effect on the syndicate structure when borrowing firms have low information transparency, are financially distressed or have low growth prospects.