Regulatory Burden, Rule of Law, and Entry of Strategic Entrepreneurs: An International Panel Study
基于54个国家六年的面板数据，研究发现较轻的监管负担能提高战略型创业的进入率和相对普遍性，且这种效应仅在法治健全时显著。
abstract Entry into entrepreneurship is a strategic act for individuals who seek an optimal way to exploit their human, social, and financial capital. Trade‐offs associated with this choice are influenced by institutional conditions. We use signalling theory, employment choice theory, and theory on strategic entry to develop hypotheses on the effect of business regulations and rule of law on strategic and non‐strategic entrepreneurial entry. Analysing a six‐year panel of 54 countries, we find lighter burden of regulation associated with a higher rate and relative prevalence of strategic entrepreneurial entry. Rule of law moderates this effect such that regulation has a significant effect on strategic entry only when rule of law is strong. These findings are robust against alternative proxies. Implications are drawn for prospective entrepreneurs, existing organizations, policy, and further research.