Probabilistic Selling, Channel Structure, and Supplier Competition*
研究了零售商混合多个竞争供应商的产品形成概率商品，发现均衡渠道结构可能不对称，且这种结构对所有企业都有利。
ABSTRACT Probabilistic selling has recently been introduced to facilitate consumer segmentation. It allows the retailer to mix products from multiple competing suppliers to generate a probabilistic good. The probabilistic good effectively creates consumer differentiation, and its presence invites extensive interactions among channel participants. In this article, we show that the equilibrium channel structure may be asymmetric: one supplier retains his brand‐name product and the other one delegates to the retailer. We further show that this asymmetric equilibrium can be mutually beneficial for all firms compared with other equilibria. In addition, the introduction of the probabilistic good is beneficial to the channel members.