Leverage, Debt Maturity and Firm Investment: An Empirical Analysis
研究了增长机会如何影响杠杆和债务期限，以及这些融资决策如何影响企业投资，发现高增长企业通过降低杠杆而非缩短债务期限来控制投资不足，杠杆对投资有负向影响。
Abstract: In this paper, we examine the potential interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions in the presence of incentive problems. We develop a system‐based approach to investigate the effects of growth opportunities on leverage and debt maturity as well as the effects of these financing decisions on firm investment. Using a panel of UK firms between 1996 and 2003, we find that high‐growth firms control underinvestment incentives by reducing leverage but not by shortening debt maturity. There is a positive relation between leverage and debt maturity as predicted by the liquidity risk hypothesis. Leverage has a negative effect on firm investment levels, which is consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis regarding the disciplining role of leverage for firms with limited growth opportunities.