Stock Market Reaction to Financial Statement Certification by Bank Holding Company CEOs
研究2002年美国SEC要求大型上市公司CEO认证财务报表后，42家银行控股公司的股价反应，发现认证日平均异常收益为正，提前认证的公司效应更强，且与银行透明度特征相关。
In 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission mandated that the chief executive officers of large, publicly traded firms certify the accuracy of their company financial statements. In this paper, I investigate whether CEO certification has had a measurable effect on the stock market valuation of the forty-two bank holding companies subject to the SEC order. I find that these firms experienced a positive average abnormal return of 30 to 60 basis points on the day of certification-a result driven primarily by those BHCs that certified ahead of the SEC's deadline. Characteristics associated with greater opaqueness-BHC asset size, liquid asset holdings, and the extent of "risky" and information-intensive lending-are systematically associated with these certification day abnormal returns. In addition, average abnormal returns for not-yet-certifying BHCs were positive, though not statistically significant, on the day the first two BHCs certified, lending weak support to the idea that early certification by some BHCs may have signaled to investors that other BHCs were likely to certify. Overall, these results suggest that the certification requirement provided relevant information to investors and was thus an effective public policy tool, at least in the banking sector.