Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games
实验发现，在多重帕累托排序均衡的协调博弈中，收取参与费（使初始均衡亏损）能促使玩家转向更优均衡，即使费用强制缴纳（前向归纳不适用）时也有效，表明玩家遵循“损失规避”原则。
We report experiments on how players select among multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria in a coordination game. Subjects initially choose inefficient equilibria. Charging a fee to play (which makes initial equilibria money-losing) creates coordination on better equilibria. When fees are optional, improved coordination is consistent with forward induction. But coordination improves even when subjects must pay the fee (forward induction does not apply). Subjects appear to use a “loss-avoidance” selection principle: they expect others to avoid strategies that always result in losses. Loss-avoidance implies that “mental accounting” of outcomes can affect choices in games.