Common Agency and the Revelation Principle
研究多个机制设计者同时试图控制一个拥有私人信息的代理人的共同代理问题，证明任何可行机制集下的均衡配置都可以通过菜单集来复现，且菜单集均衡具有弱稳健性。
In the common agency problem multiple mechanism designers simultaneously attempt to control the behavior of a single privately informed agent.The paper shows that the allocations associated with equilibria relative to any ad hoc set of feasible mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria relative to (some subset of) the set of menus.Furthermore, equilibria relative to the set of menus are weakly robust in the sense that it is possible to ¯nd continuation equilibria so that the equilibrium allocations persist even when the set of feasible mechanisms is enlarged.