Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy
建模分析媒体如何因规模经济和广告融资而偏向报道大群体（如纳税人和消费者），这种信息偏差影响政治竞争，进而扭曲公共政策，并预测电视取代报纸作为主要政治信息来源会增加针对穷人和农村选民的政府支出。
If better informed voters receive favourable policies, then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting. This paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups. The increasing-returns-to-scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups, such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests, and groups that are valuable to advertisers. This news bias alters the trade-off in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy. The paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics. The model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.