Meltzer's History of the Federal Reserve
这篇书评指出梅尔策对1913至1951年美联储的记述补充了弗里德曼和施瓦茨的《货币史》，强调体系内政策制定、独立性不确定性及经济思想对政策的影响，并指出其未能解释为何不当思想在美联储内占据主导的弱点。
This review argues that Allan Meltzer's account of the Federal Reserve between 1913 and 1951 complements Friedman and Schwartz's in their Monetary History. Meltzer emphasizes policy making within the system, rather than the evolution of the money supply and its effects on the economy. He stresses the uncertainty of the Fed's independence before the 1951 Accord, and the effects of economic ideas, notably the real bills and Riefler-Burgess doctrines, on policy. Many virtues in the book are noted, and one weakness, namely a failure to explain why inadequate ideas became dominant within the Fed when sounder alternatives were available in contemporary monetary thought.