The Knowledge Assumption in the Theory of Strategic Voting
分析了一类投票程序，引入“扩展弱占优”概念，证明在个体仅拥有其他选民偏好的部分信息时，理性个体仍可能选择非真诚策略，从而放松了战略投票文献中普遍存在的完全知识假设。
individual may indeed lead him to reject his sincere strategy. In the present paper, the same class of voting procedures is analyzed, and a similar result is shown to hold in terms of a new concept, that of weak domination in the extended sense between the strategies of an individual. The basic idea of the extension is to account for situations where only partial information on other individuals' preferences is held by members of the society, and to show that this partial would be sufficient for a rational individual to choose nonsincere strategies under certain conditions. The main motivation of this note is thus to relax the rather restrictive assumption of perfect knowledge underlying most of the analysis in the literature on strategic voting, and to examine the problem of strategic voting with a weaker assumption.