Incentives Between Firms (and Within)
回顾了1990年代激励理论（代理理论）的进展，重点介绍六种新模型，说明激励合同需要新基础、激励来源不限于合同，以及一体化决策是激励问题的手段。
This paper reviews the significant progress in “agency theory” (i.e., the economic theory of incentives) during the 1990s, with an eye toward applications to supply transactions. I emphasize six recent models, in three pairs: (1) new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts, (2) new directions in incentive theory, and (3) new applications to supply transactions. By reviewing these six models, I hope to establish three things. First, the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations. Second, new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives. Finally (and especially relevant to supply transactions), the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem.