THE ECONOMICS OF VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS
综述自愿出口限制协议的经济后果，分析其在完全竞争、不完全竞争及存在第三方供应商时的租金分配、卡特尔化效应和歧视性影响，结论比标准关税分析更复杂。
Abstract. The three substantive sections of this survey deal with the economic consequences of voluntary export restraint agreements (VERs), e.g. the Multi‐Fibre Arrangement and VERs on Japanese auto exports. Section 2 focuses on the disposition of quota rents under the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets and the absence of substitute suppliers. Section 3 considers imperfect competition and the role of VERs as cartelization instruments, facilitating collusion. Section 4 analyzes the discriminatory effects of VERs when there are third country suppliers. A broad conclusion is that the economic consequences of VERs are more complex than the standard trade policy analysis based on tariffs because of the issues discussed in Sections 3 and 4.