Firm Behavior in Franchise Monopoly Markets
利用美国有线电视行业数据，检验特许经营竞标能否约束自然垄断企业的事后机会主义行为，发现竞标虽引发一定机会主义但程度不严重，声誉效应有约束作用，而价格管制反而加剧问题。
This article presents empirical evidence concerning the value offranchise bidding competition as a means of controlling natural monopoly behavior. The analysis focuses on the cable television industry, using data collected in a survey of local government officials in cabled communities throughout the continental United States. One important potential problem raised by critics offranchise bidding is the ability offranchise winners to engage in ex post opportunistic behavior by reneging on the promises that they made in order to win the franchise contract. The results of my analysis suggest that although franchise competition does leadfirms to engage in some degree of opportunistic behavior, the extent of opportunism is not severe. Furthermore, reputation effects appear to play a role in constraining firm behavior, while rate regulation actually seems to exacerbate ex post behavioral problems.