The Survival of the Welfare State
通过一个重复投票模型，分析扭曲性收入再分配下的马尔可夫完美均衡，发现当前再分配会影响未来选民分布和私人投资，导致多重均衡；技能偏向的技术进步会降低福利国家存续的可能性。
This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting, where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution. A key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution, since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters. The model features multiple equilibria. In some equilibria, positive redistribution persists forever. In other equilibria, even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period. Skill-biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely.