Fishing in Muddy Waters: Principals, Agents, and Democratic Governance in Europe
研究了欧洲新型公共治理形式对基于代议制民主理论的民主决策、问责和控制方法的挑战，分析了欧盟及英国等地的治理网络民主绩效，指出官僚在很大程度上充当政治委托人，并提出了不预设代议制民主的民主分析研究策略。
The evolution of new forms of public governance in Europe presents a challenge to methods of democratic policy making, accountability, and control that are predicated on a theory of representative democracy. The article discusses the evolution of supranational institutions and considers empirical data on the democratic performance of governance networks in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe. It concludes that bureaucratic actors in the European Union and in subnational governance networks operate to a large extent as political principals, which would in the theory of representative democracy, promote and in some cases determine public policy. Governance networks present a special form of third-party government, with a high degree of autonomy in their specific jurisdiction. The article outlines research strategies for democratic analysis that do not presuppose representative democracy.