CEO EQUITY PORTFOLIO INCENTIVES AND LAYOFF DECISIONS
研究发现，持有更多限制性股票和股票期权组合激励的CEO更可能宣布裁员，且这些裁员能提升股东价值，对研究高管激励与运营策略的学者有参考价值。
Abstract CEOs with higher equity‐based compensation are widely believed to be more likely to act in shareholders' interests. Unlike less common acquisitions, voluntary liquidations, or seasoned equity offerings, layoffs are comparatively common elements of firms' operating strategies. We find that CEOs with at least one year of tenure who possess greater incentives from portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants are more likely to announce layoffs, and that these layoffs create shareholder value. We conclude that accumulated portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants encourage CEOs to adopt operating strategies that improve operating profits and stock performance.