Dealer Trade Group: High–Tech Venturing in a Low–Tech Industry
通过Dealer Trade Group的案例，探讨了高技术创业者在低技术传统行业中面临的领导力挑战和内部冲突，对研究创业团队动态和转型管理的学者有参考价值。
Early one morning in August 2001, Carter Crockett groaned as he pulled his rickety Honda Accord into the parking lot at 6:53 a.m. Todd Greenway’s new, oversized bright red truck was already there. Crockett was president of Dealer Trade Group (DTG) and Greenway was vice president of sales. Arriving before anyone else gave Crockett time to get ahead of the daily rush of activity; it used to be the best part of his day. But Greenway had started arriving earlier just so he could say he worked the longest hours. This early bird competition used to be fun but was becoming antagonistic. Greenway had an office next to the main entrance and Crockett had begun to resent the gloating of his unavoidable morning greetings. Despite a series of “bumps in the road,” Crockett, other senior managers, and investors believed that DTG was faring better than many online business-to-business (B2B) ventures. They knew the road would not be smooth. Indeed, it had not been: DTG offered a revolutionary, high-tech way of doing business to dealers who were mostly comfortable with traditional, low-tech automobile wholesaling. Yet sales were growing and DTG was beginning to establish credibility despite its online marketplace business model. Although DTG was still burning more cash than it was making, profitability seemed just a few months away. Crockett, who once worked at Microsoft, felt a growing sense of unease. Friction was rising between him and Greenway, who was an auto industry veteran. It had begun to undermine his authority with employees and his relationships with DTG’s investors and board. Privately, Crockett assumed much of the blame. He wondered if it was possible for him to earn Greenway’s respect and the board’s trust. He knew both were necessary to run DTG effectively. Crockett had headed DTG for 2 years. He knew other entrepreneurs who hamstrung their ventures by refusing to “let go of the wheel” when they should have. Was he taking this venture down a similar road? The original plan called for him to run DTG until they hired an industry veteran. When he suggested the idea of resigning to the board, however, they interpreted his concerns as common venture-growing pains and expressed no interest in finding an expensive CEO. Still, Crockett was uneasy. Would an industry veteran lead DTG more effectively? Was it time to get out?