AMBIGUITY ABOUT AUDIT PROBABILITY, TAX COMPLIANCE, AND TAXPAYER WELFARE
研究了审计概率的模糊性对税收遵从的影响，发现模糊厌恶者会提高遵从度，而模糊偏好者则降低，因此增加审计不确定性并非有效的政策工具，也难以提升纳税人福利。
We show that an increase in uncertainty about the probability of being audited (ambiguity) increases tax compliance for ambiguity‐averse taxpayers but reduces compliance for ambiguity lovers. Because experimental evidence reveals considerable heterogeneity with respect to ambiguity preferences, we conclude that fostering uncertainty about the probability of being audited may not be an effective policy for increasing taxpayer compliance. Moreover, because the tax authority can neither categorize nor screen taxpayers on the basis of their preferences for ambiguity, it is not likely to be either a useful or a desirable instrument for increasing taxpayer welfare.