Managers as Agents Without Principals: An Empirical Examination of Agency and Constituency Perspectives
实证检验了代理理论和选区理论关于管理者角色的命题，发现组织选区之间存在竞争性和共生性结果相互依赖，且这些依赖与选区的长期平均结果相关。
This study empirically investigated the propositions generated from agency and constituency perspectives about the nature of the managerial role. The managerial role was conceptualized as an integral part of the existing outcome interdependencies and power relations among a set of constituencies. By using time-series data on 160 companies in 10 manufacturing industries and performing three-stage least squares (3SLS) analyses, it was found that both competitive and symbiotic outcome interdependencies exist among the constituencies of organizations, and that these interdependencies are related to the long-term average outcomes of these constituencies. The implications of thesefindings for the symbolic role of managers is discussed.