Voluntary agreements in environmental protection: experiences in Germany and future perspectives
分析了德国自愿环境协议的经验，发现这些协议难以产生超出企业常规行为的环保效果，且缺乏经济激励和可执行性，建议政府保持政策灵活性。
A trend towards ‘softer’ regulation, especially in the form of negotiated environmental agreements, is observable in national and international environmental policies. Such agreements are controversial, because there are fears that government will relinquish its responsibility for environmental protection. This paper analyses recent experiences with voluntary agreements in Germany. Proponents of voluntary agreements argue that they provide incentives to business for the development of efficient, innovative and environmentally‒friendly solutions. Analysing some topical Germany examples, we conclude that it is hard to detect solutions deserving such attributes. These agreements are unlikely to produce results that go beyond what industry would have done in any case and they avoid using economic incentives; they are unenforceable, with the negotiating process leading to a watering down of the environmental goals government had originally aimed at. The Federal Government of Germany's, current preference for negotiated solutions on principle seems to be ‘counterproductive’. Government needs to be ‘in control’ to leave its choice of policy instruments open and to be flexible. Finally, we derive some general conclusions concerning reasonable strategies and applications of voluntary agreements within the EU. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.