State-sponsored violence as a tragedy of the commons: England's privateering wars with France and Spain, 1625?1630
将公地悲剧模型应用于国家支持的私掠活动，利用1625-1630年英格兰与法西战争的数据，发现敌国商船这一公地未被过度开发，私掠利润为正，但动态路径仍符合公地开发先升后降的预期。
The 'tragedy of the commons'is the familiar problem that open access to a common property resource leads to overexploitation and to zero profits. A commons model is applied to an example of state sponsored private violence, the practice of privateering or licensed piracy. It is predicted that the presence of uncertainty about the value of the prey will reduce the amount of exploiting effort, and that industry profits may be positive due to both uncertainty and heterogeneous exploiters. Using data from England's wars with France and Spain between 1625 and 1630, the model suggests that the commons, represented by enemy merchant shipping, was not overexploited and that privateering profits were positive. The dynamic paths of privateering effort, ships seized, and individual firm profits were, however, consistent with the normal expectation that commons exploitation will peak and fall, as competition drives down returns through entry. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers