TACIT COLLUSION IN AUCTIONS AND CONDITIONS FOR ITS FACILITATION AND PREVENTION: EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS
研究在同步连续升价拍卖中，基于对称折叠且物品对齐的偏好环境，默契合谋如何快速稳定形成，并检验其对制度变化的稳健性，发现只有打破偏好对称性才能有效阻止合谋。
The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions. We design and implement a “collusion incubator” environment based on a type of public, symmetrically “folded” and “item‐aligned” preferences. Tacit collusion develops quickly and reliably within the environment. Once tacit collusion developed, it proved remarkably robust to institutional changes that weakened it as an equilibrium of a game‐theoretic model. The only successful remedy was a non‐public change in the preference of participants that destroyed the symmetrically, “folded” and “item aligned” patterns of preferences, creating head‐to‐head competition between two agents reminiscent of the concept of a “maverick.”