Information Sharing in a Manufacturer–Supplier Relationship: Suppliers' Incentive and Production Efficiency
构建动态逆向选择模型，研究供应商私下掌握生产效率信息时，制造商获取不精确信号对供应商参与意愿、产量及供应链效率的影响。
While there have been vast discussions on the materialistic benefits of continuous improvement from the Toyota and Honda experiences, the academic literature pays little attention to information sharing. In this study, we construct a dynamic adverse selection model in which the supplier privately observes her production efficiency, and in the contractual duration the manufacturer obtains an informative but imprecise signal regarding this private efficiency. We show that despite the disclosure of proprietary information, information sharing may benefit the supplier; the supplier's voluntary participation is more likely to occur when the shared information is rather imprecise. On the other hand, our analysis also reveals that this information sharing unambiguously gives rise to an upward push of the production quantity, and may sometimes lead to an upward distortion that ultimately hurts the supply chain. We also document the non‐trivial impact of the timing of information sharing on the supplier's incentive to participate.