Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules
识别了两种稳定的政策组合：当货币政策积极应对通胀时，财政政策需自我稳定；若财政政策不确保偿债能力，货币政策则需相对被动。模拟表明，央行无需像财政稳定公约暗示的那样追求债务稳定。
The Fiscal Stability Pact for EMU implies that constraints on fiscal policy facilitate inflation control. In this paper we identify two stable policy regimes. When monetary policy seeks to raise real interest rates in response to excess inflation, a self-stabilising fiscal policy is required to ensure model stability. A fiscal policy which does not, by itself, ensure fiscal solvency constrains monetary policy to be relatively ‘passive’. However, in simulations we conclude that the central bank does not need to seek, on this account, the degree of debt stabilisation that appears to be implied by the fiscal stability pact.