Location Equilibrium for Cournot Oligopoly in Spatially Separated Markets
研究了多个企业在网络状空间分离市场中先选择设施位置、再决定供应量的两阶段古诺博弈，证明了产量纳什均衡的存在，并在线性需求下得到区位均衡。
Consider a two‐stage non‐cooperative Cournot game with location choice involving n ≥ 2 firms each with several facilities. There are m ≥ 2 spatially separated markets constituting the vertices of a network. Each firm first selects the locations of their facilities and then selects the quantities to supply to the markets to maximize its profit. There exists a Nash equilibrium in the quantities offered by each firm at the markets. Furthermore, when the demand in each market is sufficiently large, each firm chooses to locate its facilities only at vertices. With linear demand in each market, there exists a Nash location equilibrium.