Compensating Differentials and Self-Selection: An Application to Lawyers
建立模型分析个体在两种工作类型间的选择，取决于潜在收入差异和非金钱补偿偏好，并应用于律师选择私人与公益法律工作，发现未考虑自我选择会高估公益律师的收入牺牲。
This paper models individual choice between two types of jobs as dependent on the difference i n potential earnings and on preferences for nonpecuniary compensation. The model leads to simultaneous estimation of earnings and job choice functions in a manner that takes account of self-selection of individuals into the sector of highest utility. An application to lawyers choosing between private and "public-interest" law casts doubt on the notion that public-interest lawyers are accepting substantially lower earnings by virtue of their choice-an impression derived from es timation of earnings functions without accounting for self-selection. The estimation technique also takes proper account of the "'choice-based" nature of the sample. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.