A welfare analysis of social security in a dynastic framework*
在一个包含利他主义、寿命和收入差异的代际模型中，发现无资金社会保障能提高大多数家庭的稳态福利，主要因为双向利他主义缓解了挤出效应，且异质性导致不同家庭对社保的偏好不同。
In this article, we study the welfare effects of unfunded social security in a general equilibrium model populated with overlapping generations of altruistic individuals that differ in lifetime expectancy and earnings ability. Contrary to previous research, our results indicate that steady‐state welfare increases with social security for most households, although by very different amounts. This result is mainly due to two factors. First, the presence of two‐sided altruism significantly mitigates the crowding out effect of unfunded social security. Second, ability shocks and uncertain lifetimes generate significant heterogeneity among households to yield different induced preferences for social security.