Takeovers Improve Firm Performance: Evidence from the Banking Industry
通过分析银行盈利性与各州收购法规的关系，检验了收购活动能激励管理者最大化企业价值的假说，发现活跃的收购市场能提升银行盈利性。
The hypothesis that takeovers provide managers with the incentive to maximize firm value is tested by examining the relationship between profitability and state statutes governing takeover activity among banks. The evidence indicates that firms in states with an active takeover market are more profitable. When takeover activity is restricted, increased use of other mechanisms t hat provide an incentive to maximize firm value, such as concentration o f equity ownership and management ownership of stock, is observed. However, these alternative methods have a smaller effect on profitability and do not completely compensate for the absence of an active takeover market. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.