Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard
区分了两种道德风险，并实证衡量了第二种（事故发生后行为）在工人补偿市场中的重要性，通过分离信息不对称导致的消费变化来识别道德风险。
Two types of moral hazard have been determined. The first type is related to self-prevention activities affecting probabilities of accidents. The second type relates to the agent's activities whenever the accident occurs. The authors' objective consists of presenting an empirical measure of the significance of this second type of moral hazard in the workers' compensation market. The main challenge in isolating moral hazard consists of dividing into two parts the total variation in recovery time with respect to changes in insurance coverage: (1) the variation of consumption corresponding to a given level of information; and (2) the variation of consumption due to greater asymmetrical information. The methodology used in this study separates these two variations. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.